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Introduction
On the night of January 31, 1953, a
dynamic weather system with strong winds, in
combination with a high tide, caused exten-
sive flooding in the province of Zeeland, located
along the southwest coast of the Netherlands.
Storm surge1 from the North Sea brought water
levels to a record height of 4.55 meters above
sea level, and many dikes failed due to over-
topping and extensive wave battering. (Delta-
werken Online) As a result, 1,835 people died.
Over 750,000 inhabitants were affected, 500,000
acres of land were inundated, and the country
experienced 1.5 billion guilders ((680 million
in 2007) in direct economic losses. (Bijker, 
p. 571) This was not the first time a large flood
caused extensive damage and loss of lives; the
Dutch have been battling water for their entire
history. In fact, water poses a “double threat” to
the Netherlands, with floods arising from both
the sea and from the rivers which flow through
the country. 
Located in northwest Europe along the
North Sea, the Netherlands is situated on a
series of deltas from four major rivers — the
Rhine, Meuse, Scheldt, and Ems. Called Ned-
erland, which is Dutch for “low lands,” about
two-thirds of the country’s 34,000 square kilo-
meters of land is located below mean sea level.
(Walker et al., p. 824) Additionally, the Nether-
lands is one of the most densely-populated
countries in the world with 489 people per
square kilometer of land. 
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FROM CONTROL TO MANAGEMENT:
CHANGES IN DUTCH FLOOD
MITIGATION
Anthony Kuster
“God created the world, but the Dutch created the Netherlands.”
— old English adage
1Storm surge is the rise in water level caused by
the combination of strong winds and decreased atmospheric
pressure.
(World Fact Book . . .) With a large proportion
of its 16 million inhabitants located in flood-
prone areas, it is estimated that 70 percent of
the gross domestic product is earned in areas at
or below sea level. (Waterland.net) Combined,
these factors make the country extremely vul-
nerable to flooding disasters, which have forced
engineers to develop innovative solutions.
To protect themselves, the Dutch have
erected over 3,500 kilometers of primary flood
defenses, which include dikes,2 dunes, flood bar-
riers, and dams. (“Water in the Netherlands 
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2Dikes, or levees in American English, are raised
embankments along a waterway which restrain floodwaters
from inundating surrounding lowlands. 
Figure 1
Floodable Land without Flood Defenses
Source: “Water in the Netherlands 2004–2005: Facts and Figures.”
. . . ,” p. 14) They serve to protect the country
from the major rivers, lakes, and the sea. In Fig-
ure 1, the darker colored areas represent land
that would flood if it were not for primary
flood defenses. Without such defenses, 70 per-
cent of the country would be regularly under
water. (Waterland.net) This elaborate system
of flood protection has developed over the past
millennium, beginning with small democratic
water boards, known as waterschappen. These
organizations, in which each landowner had one
vote, were responsible for the building and
maintenance of dikes around a polder.3 This
decentralized system was effective in managing
local flood problems; however, waterschappen
were not capable of uniting to coordinate major
flood protection projects together. (Disco and
van den Ende, p. 505) 
To construct the major public works nec-
essary to fight flooding, the Dutch needed a
centralized authority with more abundant
resources. That agency is the Rijkswaterstaat,
which was created in 1798, as its charter states,
“for the administration of all that which per-
tains to public works” under the slogan “unity,
simplicity, and indivisibility.” (Lintsen, p. 554)
Since its creation, this large civil service organ-
ization has left a decisive mark on the Dutch
countryside. Numerous structural works dom-
inate the landscape, including dikes, weirs,
locks, storm surge barriers, bridges, and
viaducts — all of which serve to mitigate flood-
ing and provide infrastructure to the Dutch
people. 
Historically, the Dutch have dealt with
flooding by building increasingly larger struc-
tures. If a large river flood overtopped a dike,
they would build a bigger one. If a strong storm
pushed a storm surge inland, they would build
a barrier. Of course, as the size of the project
increases, so does its cost and impact. This
trend cannot continue, however, and the Dutch
have realized that. In this article, I examine the
changes associated with flood control tech-
niques that are currently being implemented
in the Netherlands. I discuss the historical
approaches and analyze a number of recent
policy changes. Finally, I offer some sugges-
tions for the future and discuss upcoming chal-
lenges that the Dutch may face in success-
fully transitioning their flood mitigation
techniques.
Background
Types of Floods
There are two distinct sources of floods
in the Netherlands: internal flooding, or river
floods, and external flooding, or North Sea
floods. Internal flooding occurs as a result of
excess rainfall runoff quantities being great
enough over a sufficiently short period of time
to exceed a river’s capacity. If a river is very long
(such as the Rhine, which drains water from
parts of nine countries), heavy rain in one
area can result in flooding far downstream.
(“Water in the Netherlands . . . ,” p. 39) Recent
examples of Dutch internal floods are those that
occurred in 1993 and 1995 following heavy win-
ter storms. The flood of 1995 brought flow rates
in the Rhine to six times its average discharge
and forced the evacuation of 250,000 inhabitants
and their livestock, as authorities feared dikes
would collapse. (“Water in the Netherlands . . . ,”
p. 23) While no major breaches occurred, the
incidents were a wake-up call for Dutch river
dike reform.
Most Dutch riverbanks were lined with
dikes as early as the fourteenth century. These
dikes provided some protection, but recurrent
flooding continued as sandbars and bottlenecks
developed. (Lintsen, p. 552) Engineers of the
early Rijkswaterstaat needed to decide whether
to create overflow areas, where excess flood-
water ran across uninhabited land, or to deepen
the problematic rivers. (Lintsen, p. 556) The
fateful decision was made, and in the second half
of the nineteenth century a major project was
undertaken by the Rijkswaterstaat in which
hundreds of kilometers of river were system-
atically reshaped, each receiving a standard
width and depth. Additionally, new estuaries
were dredged for the Rhine and Meuse rivers
to provide additional connections between the
rivers and the sea. Again in the 1930s the rivers
were reshaped. Some bends were removed,
and new dams were built. (Lintsen, p. 563) By
creating a complicated network of rivers and
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3A polder is a piece of land reclaimed from the sea,
located below the surrounding water level and encompassed
by dikes. The land must constantly be drained to keep the
water table from inundating the land.
canals, the Dutch are able to control discharges
with a series of sluices by diverting water from
branches with high flows to those with lower
water levels. In combination with dikes hav-
ing heights designed to handle water levels that
occur, on average, every 250 to 1,250 years, this
nature-altering strategy has protected the Dutch
from internal flooding for most of the twentieth
century. The near-disastrous floods of 1993
and 1995, however, may be indications that
increasing dike height may not be a realistic
solution for the future.
The second type of flooding, external 
flooding, has a more notorious history. With 
powerful storms that rip through the English
Channel with high winds, the North Sea has tra-
ditionally been viewed as an enemy. These exter-
nal floods come as a result of storm surge push-
ing water from the sea inland and breaching
protective dunes and dikes. When the land
behind the protection lies below sea level, as
is the case in the Netherlands, the flooding is
exacerbated. Folklore from the Middle Ages
repeatedly pits the Dutch against the sea in leg-
ends that are usually the result of many cata-
strophic floods. In some of the more horrific
accounts dating as far back as A.D. 838, tens
of thousands of people are estimated to have lost
their lives in floods. (Deltawerken Online) The
most notable example of external flooding, how-
ever, is the North Sea Flood of 1953. As a result
of this catastrophe, sweeping changes came
about in Dutch design criteria and flood control
techniques. These changes have been encom-
passed in the Delta Project.
The Delta Project4
Three weeks following the 1953 disaster, a
government commission was created to inves-
tigate the causes of the flood and give advice
to improve flood protection techniques. Within
20 days, the Delta Commission, as it was called,
issued an interim version of what would become
the Delta Plan. Named by the creative director
of the Rijkswaterstaat, A.G. Maris, the Delta
Plan acquired such a sense of urgency and a
need for change that even today the Dutch
use “Delta Plan” to refer to anything that
requires a major change, including art restora-
tion and river dike safety. (Bijker, p. 577) The
Plan called for the closure of all estuaries in
order to shorten the coastline by 800 kilome-
ters. (Waterland.net) In effect, the Dutch were
building a continuous, rigid “wall against the
sea.” The only exceptions were the two estuar-
ies which connect Antwerp and Rotterdam to
the North Sea. While safety was the top priority,
the economic importance of these two immense
ports required uninhibited access to the sea.
To fulfill the Commission’s recommendations,
a series of dams and barriers, known as the Delta
Works,5 was constructed along the southern
Dutch coast. Costing a total of (5 billion, the
Delta Plan not only changed the face of Holland,
but also changed the way the Dutch designed
flood protection. (Jans)
First, each dike ring6 was assigned a safety
level. The safety level was described as the prob-
ability that a certain water level would be
reached or exceeded in any given year, based on
historical data. Depending on the ring, these val-
ues ranged between 1 in 1,250 and 1 in 10,000.
Areas with high concentrations of population
and valuable assests, such as airports or indus-
trial centers, were assigned higher safety levels.
For example, Dike Ring 14 is home to 3.2 mil-
lion residents and includes the major cities of
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. Addi-
tionally, the area is heavily industrialized. (van
Westen, p. 23) For such a critical dike ring,
the Dutch designed the dikes for water levels
that should be exceeded, on average, only once
every 10,000 years. By assigning different safety
levels throughout the country, the Dutch prior-
itized spending, thus improving efficiency. Addi-
tionally, the method by which the Dutch
designed the dikes also revolutionized flood con-
trol, as I explain below.
By applying cost-benefit analysis to flood
control design, the Rijkswaterstaat systemati-
cally improved its own efficiency and effective-
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4Unless otherwise noted, the information in this
section can be found in Smits, Nienhuis, and Saeijs, “Chang-
ing Estuaries, Changing Views.”
5Known as the Deltawerken in Dutch, the Delta
Works is the largest water protection project in the world.
For more information on each component, see Delta-
werken.com.
6The Netherlands is divided into 53 regions, known
as dike rings. Each is entirely surrounded by a continuous
system of dikes, which form a “ring” around the area.
They vary greatly in area and population.
ness. Once a safety level was determined for each
dike ring, the water level corresponding to
that safety level was calculated. Take, for exam-
ple, Dike Ring 14 and its 1-in-10,000-year safety
level. Using historical weather data, land con-
tours, and models, the Rijkswaterstaat calcu-
lated a water level that should have a 1-in-
10,000 probability of occuring or being exceeded
in any given year. The agency then determined
the value of damages to property within the ring
as a function of dike height. Thus, as the dike
height increases, the value of the damages
decreases, because water is breaching the dike
less frequently. For example, if it is assumed that
the 10,000-year water level is six meters (Figure
2), the average damages curve depicted in Fig-
ure 2 can be observed to level off considerably
at dike heights greater than six meters. The rea-
son is that if the water level is six meters,
there is theoretically no greater protection from
a seven-meter dike than from a six-meter dike.
Next, the cost of dike construction was deter-
mined as a function of dike height. Of course,
this curve increases with dike height. By sum-
ming these two curves, as seen in Figure 2, a
total cost curve is created. The minimum value
of the total costs, seen here to be between 5.0
and 5.5 meters, is the optimum dike height
using cost-benefit analysis. Notice that the
10,000-year dike height is less than the 10,000-
year water level. The reason is that the marginal
cost of building a higher dike is greater than the
marginal benefit (decreased damages) of build-
ing a higher dike. 
Using this approach the Dutch have con-
tinued their millenium-long pattern of land
reclamation and structural defense against the
sea, ultimately culminating with the completion
of the Maeslant Barrier in 1997. Protecting
the Nieuwe Waterweg, the waterway which gives
access to the port of Rotterdam, this moveable
barrier has four times the amount of steel in the
Eiffel Tower and has the world’s two largest ball
bearings, each weighing 680 tons. (Delta-
werken.com) The Dutch had built moveable
storm surge barriers before — the first was con-
structed on the Hollandse IJssel in 1958 —
but never ones of this size. Celebrated as a tri-
umph for the Netherlands, the completion of
the Maeslant Barrier meant that the Delta
Project was finally complete.
The Delta Project’s closing of estuaries was
hailed as a success for Dutch flood safety; no
external floods have afflicted the country since
the Project’s inception in 1953. Over that period,
however, many other problems have been expe-
rienced. First, by closing estuaries to the sea,
the barriers disrupted the existing ecosystems.
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Figure 2
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Dike Construction
Source: Kuijpers, Remarks to Martindale Students, May 16, 2007.
Normally, changing tides create a transition
zone between salt and fresh waters, which devel-
ops a diverse habitat for a variety of species.
By erecting a barrier, the salinity of the water
is greatly affected, resulting in a drastic change
in the environment. For example, two water-
ways, Veersche Gat and Grevelingmeer, were
disconnected from the North Sea in 1961 and
1971, respectively, by high sea walls. The result-
ing brackish lagoons exhibited entirely different
habitats with less diversity than before their clo-
sure, thus greatly reducing the beneficial func-
tions of the ecosystem. (van Westen, p. 22) Addi-
tionally, by disconnecting river outlets from the
sea, the changing tides cannot flush sediment
which collects along the river and is deposited
at the river’s mouth. This process can be
extremely important in maintaining a healthy
ecosystem when the sediment is laden with pes-
ticides, industrial waste, or heavy metals. Pol-
lution has long been a problem for the Rhine
River, which passes through Germany’s heavily-
industrialized Ruhrgebiet. Without proper
flushing, the collection of this pollution in the
Netherlands would result in poor water qual-
ity. (van Westen, p. 22) Furthermore, there were
many unexpected costs associated with the Delta
Project. Maintanance costs were higher than
expected, and there were unforeseen expendi-
tures to restore natural habitats and fix water
quality problems.
Nevertheless, there have been success sto-
ries as well. The creation of lakes behind sea
walls has generated new economic opportuni-
ties for those regions, including recreation, fish-
ing, and agriculture. By shortening the coast-
line by 800 kilometers and extending protected
estuaries, a larger supply of fresh water became
available to agriculture in the south. This
allowed irrigation water to be redirected north-
ward, where it was needed. (Waterland.net) 
Also, sea walls were often built with highways
on top. These new highways have improved
transportation between the many islands of Zee-
land, some of which had been isolated for cen-
turies. (Waterland.net) 
Moreover, the Dutch have not entirely
ignored the importance of a healthy environ-
ment throughout the Delta Project. In 1978 the
Dutch government agreed to change the design
for the Osterschelde Barrier to allow for greater
tidal exchange. Instead of the impervious dike
originally planned, a sluice system that could
close during heavy storms was constructed. The
change came as a result of the environmental
movement of the 1970s and the environmen-
tal damage resulting from the Delta Project.
As a result, the Osterschelde estuary has not
experienced the same deterioration of natural
habitat as Veersche Gat and Grevelingmeer. (van
Westen, p. 22)
Changing Society, Changing
Environment
“Trend is not destiny.”
— René Dubois
The world in which the Delta Project was
originally conceived exists no more. The people,
economy, and environment of the Netherlands
are changing, and these changes are having a
profound impact on the Dutch flood mitigation
program. The many components of the Delta-
werken and the thousands of kilometers of dikes
constructed along rivers are examples of the tra-
ditional technical measures7 that the Dutch 
have built to protect themselves from high
water by blocking it out. However, while these
measures are extremely important to the con-
tinuing existence of the Netherlands, looming
problems make them inadequate solutions for
the future.
The need for land to house agriculture has
been a driving force for land reclamation from
the sea, and much area has been polderized to
create arable land or grazing pastures. Agri-
culture is an extremely important component
of the Dutch economy. In fact, the value of agri-
cultural products exported annually by the
Netherlands is the second highest in the world
at $55 billion, exceeded only by the U.S., which
exports $68 billion per year in agricultural prod-
ucts. More specifically, the country is a power-
house in horticulture exports,8 specializing in
ornamental plants and bulbs. The Netherlands
is the largest exporter of ornamental plant prod-
ucts, and 80 percent of all flower bulbs originate
in the Netherlands. (Pinckaers, p. 4) Historically,
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7Traditional technical measures will be defined here
as any physical structures used to mitigate flooding, such
as dikes, dams, canals, ditches, and pumping stations.
8Plants, flowers, vegetables, and fruit.
the meat and dairy industry has also contributed
significantly to agriculture. However, the emer-
gence of other accessible beef markets, such
as Brazil which exports 10 million kilograms
of beef annually to the Netherlands, has dimin-
ished the need for land-strapped countries like
the Netherlands to produce meat and dairy
products. (Cattlesite.com) This is significant
because while only 8 percent of agricultural
acreage is devoted to horticulture production,
it comprises 41 percent of the value of Dutch
agriculture. (Pinckaers, p. 6) As the Dutch agri-
culture sector becomes less dependent on meat
and dairy production, the amount of land nec-
essary will also decrease, thus decreasing agri-
culture’s demand for land reclamation.
Just as the Dutch agricultural sector is
changing, so is the environment. The Royal
Netherlands Meteorological Institute (RNMI)
projects that by the year 2100 average winter
precipitation in the Netherlands will increase
between 6 percent and 25 percent and that sea
levels will rise between 20 centimeters and
110 centimeters. (Können, p. 2) Additionally,
the Dutch land mass continues to sink at an
average rate of 40 centimeters per century,
due to the settling of drained peat soils and
other geological processes. (Woltjer and Al, p.
214) The combination of rising sea levels and
land subsidence is creating a growing gap
between water and land elevations. Without
major intervention, the important industrial
and business centers of Amsterdam, The Hague,
and Rotterdam are at risk. Additionally, the
Netherlands is already a densely urbanized
country with a continually growing population.
According to a 2001 forecast from the Min-
istry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environ-
ment, there will be a 33 percent increase in
the amount of land needed for combined resi-
dential and commercial use by the year 2030.
(Woltjer and Al, p. 215) Due to the combination
of the continued growth of the Dutch econ-
omy and population and the ever-changing envi-
ronmental conditions, it will be necessary for
the Dutch to integrate sustainable practices into
flood mitigation design to ensure continuing
existence in a changing world. Additionally, it
will become increasingly important to combine
land uses to satisfy all needs. For example, by
building floating homes, land might be used
to both store water and provide housing, or by
creating wetlands, land might serve to store
water and provide a natural habitat. (Woltjer and
Al, p. 214)
Following the construction of the dikes
and barriers, the heightened sense of safety
has encouraged increased urban development
in former flood plains. Often there is a sense
of absolute safety against flooding. In fact, if
asked, most Dutch would say they rarely think
about the threat of flooding in their daily lives.
(Kuijpers, 2007) This sense of safety has created
a dramatic development boom behind dike
walls. As a result, estimated safety levels have
become inaccurate. Referring back to Figure
2, the damage curve is shifted upward due to the
increased value of the investments in the dike
rings. That shift in turn increases the opti-
mum dike heights necessary to maintain safety
levels designated by the Delta Plan. The result
are dike heights that have safety levels which are
less than original Delta levels. Put simply, to
maintain the desired safety levels, the dikes need
to be raised further. To explain it in more tech-
nical terms, risk is usually defined as the prob-
ability of an unwanted event multiplied by its
consequences, i.e. Risk = Probability x Effect.
(Smits et al., p. 344) In the case of flooding
risk analysis, risk would be the probability of a
flood occurring multiplied by the damages
caused by the flood. When this analysis is
applied to post-Delta Netherlands, it shows that
risk has increased. While the probability of a
flood occurrence has decreased since 1953,
because of greater development the levels of
potential damages have increased dramati-
cally. (Smits et al., p. 345) 
A New Approach
“Nederland leeft met water.” 9
— Dutch flood awareness campaign slogan
Because conventional techniques would
be too costly to combat flooding in light of
the trends described in the previous section, a
new committee — the Water Management in
the Twenty-First Century Advisory Commit-
tee — was created in the spring of 1999. The
Committee was charged with “making recom-
mendations for desirable changes to the water
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9Dutch for “The Netherlands lives with water.”
management policy . . . , focusing on the con-
sequences of climatic change, rising sea 
levels and land subsidence.” (“A Different
Approach to Water,” p. 13) The Dutch Cabinet10
responded with its own report entitled “A Dif-
ferent Approach to Water,” in which the Cabi-
net states its position on water management for
the next century. Combined, the reports con-
cluded that water management and spatial
planning11 policies must change dramatically
and that land must be “given back” to the water
to insure safety. The Cabinet’s document
became the impetus for a number of new
national policies, with many strengthening the
link between spatial planning and water man-
agement. One such policy, described below, is
arguably the biggest turning point in Dutch
flood mitigation, as it focuses resources away
from technical measures and toward policy-
oriented approaches.
The national government publishes Spe-
cial Planning Key Decisions (SPKDs) to estab-
lish a broad strategy for spatial planning. They
include long-term goals and recommenda-
tions pertaining to spatial planning. Provinces
use these SPKDs to create regional plans, which
municipalities then use to create detailed land
use plans. In 2006 the Dutch Cabinet approved
a SPKD entitled Ruimte voor de Rivier (RvdR),
or Room for the Rivers. RvdR aims to refocus
attention from dike reinforcement to spatial
planning. Instead of building large, expensive
dikes, which attempt to control flood waters,
specific areas of land will be allowed to flood.
The main objectives of Ruimte voor de Rivier
are to deepen the land neighboring rivers, dis-
place dikes inland, and lower groynes12 in rivers.
The reinforcement of dikes will be a last resort
if all other options are too expensive or inade-
quate. This approach accepts the reality that
floods are inevitable. 
Figure 3 presents an excellent example
of the problem that many cities, such as Arn-
hem, are facing around the Netherlands. Urban-
ization has encroached and constricted the
riverbanks, creating a bottleneck that ampli-
fies flooding conditions. Seen in Figure 3,
Arnhem is located at the confluence of the
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10The Dutch Cabinet is the main executive body of 
the Netherlands and consists of the ministers and state 
secretaries.
11Spatial planning, more commonly called land use
planning in North America, refers to the practices and
policies that influence the distribution of activities and
development in a region.
12Groynes (or groins) are structures perpendicular to
the riverbank which are built to catch sediment. 
Source: “A Different Approach to Water,” p. 44.
Figure 3
Urbanization around Arnhem
Neder-Rijn and Ijssel rivers. In 1830 these rivers
formed a wide channel where flood waters could
be dissipated. Over time, however, urban growth
reclaimed much of the river’s space, forcing
its discharge to funnel through a bottleneck
located in the center of the city. At this sec-
tion of the river the water level during a flood
becomes higher than it would in its natural
state, inflicting greater damage. As climatic
changes and increased precipitation cause
greater discharges in the rivers, the safety
level decreases. In cities like Arnhem, there is
no room for the expansion of dikes. Instead,
retention areas can be built upstream that will
reduce the peak discharge and increase infiltra-
tion of that water into the ground. A number
of pilot projects have been designed for the
Ruimte voor de Rivier program, and the Cabi-
net has earmarked (2.2 billion for the measures
in the plan. (Ruimte voor . . .)
A similar project to those planned in RvdR
can be found in the Westerscheldt — the Dutch
portion of the inlet to Antwerp — and may have
served as a prototype for the SPKD. Centuries
of dredging have deepened the channel to acco-
modate larger ships, which in turn increases the
volume of water that moves through the inlet.
Simultaneously, development has reclaimed
portions of former flood plains, thus narrow-
ing the space available through which the flood
water can flow. The combination of more water
moving through a smaller space creates higher
water levels and, therefore, an increased risk
of flooding. Furthermore, constructing a bar-
rier was both financially and politically out of
the question. (Smits et al., p. 348) Realizing this
danger, in the early 1990s Dutch and Flemish
authorities designed a solution which would
return flood plains to the river. They termed the
areas Controlled Inundation Areas. (Smits et al.,
p. 349) First, they built a new dike farther inland
and then removed the old dike. Known as ont-
poldern, or depolderizing, this practice is at the
heart of Ruimte voor de Rivier and the future of
Dutch flood management. One advantage of this
strategy is an increased level of safety. The
newly-formed flood plains and natural wetlands
can absorb energy from storm surge or flood
waves, dissipating their effect. Also, the water-
shed develops a greater capacity to hold water,
which decreases discharge levels downstream.
Additionally, the creation of new wetlands,
which serve as parklands and wildlife reserves,
develops ecological potential and recreational
opportunities. (Smits et al., p. 349)
There are over two dozen locations
throughout the Netherlands that will receive
similar procedures as part of giving “room for
the rivers.” The primary focus will be on the
Rhine and Meuse rivers and their tributaries.
Scheduled to be completed in 2014, the ontpold-
ern of Overdiep polder will be the first project
directed under Ruimte voor de Rivier. This
polder is currently a 1400-acre island along
the Bergse Meuse river (a tributary of the
Meuse) with seventeen farms, a marina, and a
military training base located on it. (Gagliano)
The water-retaining dikes will be removed and
the existing farm structures will be rebuilt on
the top of 20-foot, 6-acre mounds. By depolder-
ing Overdiep, the river will be able to flood
the land occasionally, at an estimated average
rate of once per 25 years. The result will be a
drop in area water levels of up to 30 centime-
ters, which will be felt far downstream. (Ruimte
voor . . .) The idea, by the way, is not new;
during the Middle Ages many Dutch farmers
lived on mounds, known as “terps,” while their
livestock grazed below. (Gagliano) In fact, it was
the farmers of Overdiep who proposed this solu-
tion. Their other option would have been to
accept compensation for their land and to desert
their farms. Because agricultural land is at a
premium in the densely-populated country, that
option was undesirable. 
Designing and implementing these poli-
cies within the Netherlands is not enough,
though. International cooperation in imple-
menting flood-related policies is paramount. All
four major rivers which discharge into the
Netherlands have watersheds that are located
primarily outside the country. Excess water and
pollution from other countries thus become a
Dutch problem. To encourage international
cooperation, the EU has designed the EU Water
Framework Directive. Under this directive coun-
tries will work together on such programs as
river widening. 
In addition to the strategies for flood
mitigation, the methods by which the Dutch
analyze risk are changing, too. While the basic
concept of cost-benefit analysis remains, its
application has become more complex with
the addition of improved technology and data.
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Better understanding of dike failure mecha-
nisms, as well as better modeling techniques,
allow the Dutch to calculate more accurate esti-
mates of the probability of dike failure. In its
first applications, cost-benefit analyses only
accounted for overtopping; today, engineers
realize there are many other failure mechanisms
for dikes, with the most critical being piping,13
instability, erosion, and human error (e.g. not
closing a sluice in sufficient time). With all pos-
sibilities of failure considered, the calculated
risk of flooding increases.
Finally, because nearly all flood mitigation
projects in the Netherlands fall under the pub-
lic sector, it is very important to have public sup-
port and understanding. Realizing this, the
Dutch government began a public awareness
program in February 2003. (“Water in . . . ,” 
p. 9) The goal of the program was to increase
awareness in the Netherlands of the impact of
climate change on flooding and the efforts of the
Dutch government to solve these problems.
Specifically, the programs introduced the new
concept of “giving water more room” and
encouraged support of it. To bolster aware-
ness, the program also used a TV weatherman
and self-proclaimed “water ambassador” named
Peter Timofeef as spokesman. Making radio and
television appearances and starring in cartoons,
he comments on the problems and solutions
associated with water. Additionally, during the
Dutch presidency of the EU from July to Decem-
ber of 2004, 27 signs were erected at various
locations which mark sea level. Tourists and 
residents alike gain a stronger understanding of
the everyday vulnerability of the Netherlands
this way. The program has been successful in
raising awareness of the continual danger of
flooding.
Conclusion
The Dutch continue to be world leaders
in flood protection. Their unique location
between rivers and the sea has required them
to constantly be innovative and aggressive. The
battle against water has changed throughout his-
tory and the Dutch have continually adapted
to new challenges. In today’s world, where
changes are occurring at an even greater pace,
this ability to adapt becomes even more impor-
tant. The past decade has seen a stark transi-
tion in Dutch national water management pol-
icy as a result of social and environmental
pressures. The transition is not complete, how-
ever, and the keys to success will be the imple-
mentation of the policies and their adoption into
engineering works. The effectiveness of new
strategies will soon be tested, as such factors
as climate change, rising sea levels, land subsi-
dence, and expanded urbanization increase pres-
sure on the system. These changes will have last-
ing effects on the Dutch landscape and society. 
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bility in the dike’s foundation.
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